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Embedded Promissory Futures: The Rise 
of Networked Agribusiness in Argentina’s 
Bioeconomy
Pierre Delvenne
“The bioeconomy is one of the things that in principle everyone agrees on” (personal 
Interview with a public official from the Science, Technology and Productive 
Innovation Ministry).
IntroductIon
In Argentina, as elsewhere, policy discourse on “the bioeconomy” addresses 
an abstraction as if it had a concrete existence. The policy plan Bioeconomia 
Argentina 2016 states: “Argentina has features that offer multiple oppor-
tunities for the development of the local bioeconomy. The country has a 
vast territory, large variety of climates and biodiversity, an important area of 
native and planted forests, and highly competitive agricultural and livestock 
and agribusiness sectors”.1
As argued in this book, the concept of the bioeconomy is an act of 
political imagination. According to Goven and Pavone (2015: 6), “[i]t is 
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2  P. DELVENNE
a promissory construct that is meant to induce and facilitate some actions 
while deterring others; most explicitly, it is meant to bring about a par-
ticular set of changes that will shape the parameters of possible future 
action.” Argentinean policymakers today instrumentally use the concept 
to try to re-territorialize economic activities by promoting regional/pro-
vincial bioeconomies (emphasizing the plural) and, more importantly, to 
conclusively transcend a historically entrenched dichotomy between agri-
culture and industry.
Recent institutional embodiments of these political attempts can 
be observed, for instance, with the creation of a Secretary of State for 
Bioeconomy (rebranded in late 2015 as a “Secretary of State for Added 
Value”) and its institutional lodging within the Ministry of Agroindustry 
(formerly “Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle Raising and Fishing”) in the 
aftermath of the most recent presidential elections. Mauricio Macri, 
the newly elected President, stressed in his first speech that a key chal-
lenge of his administration was to “achieve the agroindustrialization of 
Argentina”. This is probably where the political value of the bioecon-
omy concept lies: it is an attempt at definitively crossing a formerly set-
tled boundary between agriculture and industry. As a political project, 
bioeconomy appears as the latest stage of a co-production process at the 
intersection of the political and technoscientific levels. At the techno-
scientific level, the global adoption of technological packages (biotech-
nologies + herbicides + new farming practices) started long before the 
emergence of the bioeconomy concept and provided a hospitable ground 
for its successful integration into national discourses. At the politi-
cal level, the roots of the bioeconomy are to be found in the neoliberal 
1980s but, interestingly, both progressive (so-called “anti-neoliberal”) and 
conservative governments sit comfortably with the concept. Whereas 
Argentinean politics usually is extremely polarized and antagonistic, poli-
cymakers from opposed sides of the political spectrum have tried to enact 
a specific world with the help of similar bioeconomic narratives.
The success of the bioeconomy as a political project, however, lies 
in the possibility for this world to fit the collective capacities of imagi-
nation, which are deeply entrenched in the past. Effectively, the inter-
actions between emerging imaginative capacities and already existing 
collective imaginations enable and constrain what actions will be possible 
in the future. When a new master narrative such as the bioeconomy cir-
culates and embeds itself in specific countries (Delvenne and Hendrickx 
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and technological trajectories that constitute the strata of knowledge/
social orders as they have unfolded up to the present day. In this chapter, 
I use the “idiom of co-production” (Jasanoff 2004) to track and discuss 
the regularities of this sedimentation process from the 1970s onwards, as 
well as the tensions that arose when disruptive events affected the normal 
course of sedimentation, and past social fractures and conflicts resurfaced. 
The idiom of co-production, briefly stated, “is shorthand for the prop-
osition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both 
nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose 
to live in it” (Jasanoff 2004). A co-production framework stresses the 
importance of contextualization to make sense of the emergence and 
stabilization of new technoscientific objects or the resolution of scien-
tific and technological controversies (Bonneuil et al. 2014). Importantly 
for this chapter, co-production opens up “the possibility of seeing cer-
tain ‘hegemonic’ forces, not as given but as the (co-)products of contin-
gent interactions and practices. These insights may, in turn, open up new 
opportunities for explanation, critique and social action” (Jasanoff 2004).
Whereas many authors have undertaken co-productionist analyses 
mainly focusing on certain epistemic claims (e.g. scientific) and certain 
social formations (e.g. the state), this chapter additionally makes use of 
it to analyze the development of a political economy as both epistemic 
and social order (Rajan 2012; Jasanoff 2012; Birch 2016). Inspired by 
Joly (2015), I undertake a “strong co-productionist analysis”, meaning 
that I pay attention to the diversity of processes that operate at different 
scales (from local socio-technical arrangements to system level) and to 
their interactions. A strong co-productionist approach “considers power 
as relational and it is attentive to lasting asymmetries of power, the use of 
force, constraint, ‘fait accompli’, and the accumulation of resources and 
competences by some actors at the expense of others” (ibid).
This chapter analyzes the “bioeconomy” of genetically modified soy 
in Argentina, the world’s third leading producer and exporter of GM 
crops. GM soy production is a central source of extraction of economic 
value, which has provided the economic oxygen to the country since it 
declared a partial default on its national debt in 2001. As of 2014, soy 
sector exports represented 28% of total Argentine exports and accounted 
for USD 20 billion in foreign income (INDEC 2015).
The chapter is based on fieldwork carried out between 2010 and 2016, 
as well as secondary sources (press articles, regulatory and legal docu-
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31 in 2011 and 6 in 2015, 17 in 2016) carried out with individuals in 
Buenos Aires and Rosario who are involved in the GM soy complex or 
who have had a say in the public discussion around it (including members 
of academia, public administration, seed and agrochemical companies, 
agricultural production, regulation, distribution sectors, financial inves-
tors, managers of sowing pools, and related civil society organizations). 
Some of the key informants were interviewed up to three times, and the 
interviews were systematically analyzed, categorized and tagged with the 
qualitative software Mosaiqs.
The text is structured as follows. It begins with a discussion of the 
international and domestic political economy of Argentina during the 
past 30 years, to stress the co-production dynamics of the GM soy model 
with its political-economic contexts (neoliberal in the 1990s and national-
populist in the 2000s/2010s). The next section focuses on the techno-
scientific level, in particular how the adoption of a technological package 
(biotechnology + herbicide + new farming techniques) has created an 
opportunity structure supporting the emergence of a vanguard vision 
aimed at “revolutionizing” agriculture. Following that, I analyze a par-
ticularly consequential development within Argentina’s GM soy bioecon-
omy: “pooles de siembra” (sowing pools), the name given to an agricultural 
production system characterized by the organization of a financial enter-
prise system that assumes temporary control of agricultural production.
the PolItIcal economy of GenetIcally modIfIed Soy
In the 1970s, Argentina went through a series of transformations 
toward a new regime of capitalist accumulation. On March 24, 1976, 
a military coup brought to power a violent dictatorship that, until the 
recovery of democracy in 1983, devastated the country economically, 
politically and socially (Giarracca and Teubal 2004; Hernandez 2013). 
Contrary to what happened at the same period in neighboring coun-
tries, especially Brazil, where the dictatorship was supportive of indus-
try, Argentina went through a time of deindustrialization and openings 
of its economy to financial liberalization. The “authoritarian bureaucratic 
state” (O’Donnell 1979) implemented a series of measures that pro-
foundly affected the labor, agricultural, capital, and financial markets. 
Wage increases were frozen in the public sector and the dictatorship 
adopted provisions favoring large companies and financial and specula-
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10 EMBEDDED PROMISSORy FUTURES: THE RISE OF NETWORkED …  5
and constituted a severe drag on policies and strategies of subsequent 
democratic governments. Total external debt increased by almost USD 
36 billion between 1976 and 1983, the year of the democratic recovery 
(Teubal and Teubal 2011: 63). At the end of the 1980s, when the gov-
ernment temporarily suspended debt repayment, there was a massive and 
generalized capital flight, which accelerated the devaluation of the cur-
rency, led President Alfonsin to resign and provoked the hyper-inflation-
ary outbreak period of 1989–1991. These conditions set the scene for 
the profound process of neoliberalization during the administrations of 
President Carlos Menem (1989–1995 and 1995–1999).
The agricultural sector was at the forefront of this neoliberalization 
process: production was re-oriented towards export markets; the institu-
tions and mechanisms that regulated production for the internal market 
were eliminated; and global agribusiness corporations expanded their 
operations (Lapegna 2016: 6). In the early 1990s, the structural adjust-
ment plan carried out by the first Menem government deregulated the 
markets for goods and capital, enacted the Convertibility Law, which 
pegged the value of the peso to that of the US dollar (Giarracca and 
Teubal 2004), and privatized public assets. These macroeconomic con-
ditions stimulated the free movement of financial capital and, in return, 
undermined the little competitiveness that remained in the Argentine 
industrial sector. The concentration of land and capital in agriculture 
was facilitated by the enactment in 1992 of Law No. 24083 of mutual 
fund investments, under which the organization of sowing pools was 
designed, in order to turn agribusiness into a privileged niche for quick 
returns on financial capital investments (Hernandez 2013).
The neoliberal agrarian restructuring accelerated in the second half of 
the 1990s. The national government approved the commercialization of 
herbicide-tolerant GM soy in 1996, and the biotechnology regulatory 
regime was transformed on the basis of market principles benefiting large 
corporations (Otero 2012; Delvenne et al. 2013). Combined with new 
agricultural techniques well adapted to Argentinean conditions, particu-
larly no-till farming, glyphosate-tolerant soy has been by far the most 
rapid adoption of any seed variety in Argentina, including those intro-
duced in the Green Revolution (Penna and Lema 2003). Consequently, 
soy has replaced beef and wheat (the primary goods consumed by the 
urban working class) as the country’s leading export.
As Gras and Hernandez (2014: 343) explain, “a key explana-
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6  P. DELVENNE
environment of the mid-1990s, which was shaped by a combination of 
volatile international commodity prices and the impact of Argentina’s 
neoliberal economic policies on farmers”. These impacts on the agricul-
tural sector were indeed significant: Menem’s government reduced farm 
subsidies and trade protections, and increased interest rates on agricul-
tural loans. In these conditions, for many indebted farmers the only way 
forward was to embrace the new biotechnological wave:
you have a problem of technological shock in the mid-90s. you have a 
problem of variation in international prices and profitability; farmers were 
indebted and the only way out was an upgrade to biotechnology and the 
new technological package, whereby at the end of the 2000s, you had 
24–25 million cultivated hectares and 14 million mortgaged hectares. yes, 
Schumpeter is expensive… (Agricultural economist 1)
After 1997, the economy experienced a sharp decline and unemploy-
ment soared (Caceres 2015: 120), eventually leading to the 2001 crash, 
when the neoliberal model of a decade of Menemismo collapsed and 
forced Argentina to declare a partial default on its national debt (Teubal 
and Teubal 2011). At that time, half of Argentines were living in poverty, 
amongst the highest rates of inequality in history, with immense despair 
in a context of institutional, political, and economic crisis (Leguizamon 
2014: 155; Carranza 2005). Five different presidents succeeded each 
other in less than 10 days during the 2001 crisis. The fifth of them was 
Eduardo Duhalde, who decided to abandon convertibility with the USD, 
to devalue the peso, and to call for a general election (Caceres 2015: 121). 
The Peronist political party then came back to power: Néstor kirchner 
was elected president (2003–2007), to be followed by his wife Cristina 
Fernández de kirchner (2007–2011 and 2011–2015), what political 
analysts called the “kirchnerist” period. kirchnerism was however not a 
monolithic block. Argentinean political economist Mathias kulfas (2016) 
considers that the country has known three types of kirchnerism.
The first kirchnerism started with Néstor kirchner’s presidency, which 
was a historical moment for soy export and profitability. During this time 
there was a sustained international demand for soy products (notably from 
emerging markets of China and India) coupled with a high price of com-
modities on global markets. Richardson (2009) coined the term “export-
oriented populism” to argue that under Néstor kirchner’s government, 
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10 EMBEDDED PROMISSORy FUTURES: THE RISE OF NETWORkED …  7
country’s leading export) and productivity (which dramatically increased 
as an effect of the adoption of the GM soy technological package, see next 
section) created the conditions of a new variant of populism, temporar-
ily eliminating important sources of political and economic instability that 
had plagued previous incarnations of Argentine populism. “Because soy 
is not consumed by the working class, kirchner could both promote and 
tax their export, generating fiscal revenue for populist programs while not 
harming the effective purchasing power of urban workers or provoking 
a balance-of-payments crisis” (Richardon 2009: 228). Export-oriented 
populism even expanded under the second kirchnerism, coinciding with 
Cristina Fernández de kirchner’s first presidency (2007–2011),2 as she 
decided to increase the export taxes from 30 to 35%. “Increasing foreign 
income from agricultural exports and higher fiscal revenue explain how it 
was possible for the kirchners to return to a model of state intervention, 
investing in infrastructure and social spending, without enacting major 
structural reform, thus keeping intact the agro-export model devised in 
the neoliberal 1990s” (Leguizamon 2014: 156).
The kirchners thus conserved and reinforced the transgenic soy 
model they inherited. As Amalia Leguizamon explains:
[T]he rise of a self-proclaimed anti-neoliberal and progressive govern-
ment, the kirchners’, has in fact not dismantled the mode of production 
set in place by the previous neoliberal administration. To the contrary, the 
kirchners’ administrations have created favorable conditions for the expan-
sion of GM soy. Driven by debt, both neoliberal and post-neoliberal gov-
ernments have relied on state policy to intensify Argentina’s comparative 
advantage. (Leguizamon 2014: 158)
It is important to note that although state intervention is key to neo-
liberal policy, in most cases it is often so only in the supply side of the 
economy. In a way, without dismantling the supply side, Nestor and 
later Cristina kirchner have been able to use part of the surplus to reac-
tivate, selectively, some demand-side oriented policies. However, this 
strategy was severely challenged by a series of crises. The global finan-
cial crisis of 2008–2009 eventually eroded Argentinean growth rates; 
a major drought in 2008 curtailed soy production; the slow erosion 
of international prices of agricultural commodities reduced returns on 
soy; and most importantly, in 2008 the countryside (the campo) rose 
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8  P. DELVENNE
intention to increase the export tax on soy to 50%. kirchner attempted 
to do this through executive measure (“Resolucion 125”) to avoid hav-
ing it voted on by Parliament (see Fraga and Baistrocchi 2011). That 
attempt failed and sparked a conflict that paralyzed the country for sev-
eral months: roads and bridges were blocked and there were massive 
street demonstrations and public events against Cristina kirchner. This 
conflict disrupted the ideological patterns of classical Peronism, histori-
cally marked by a dichotomous view of the bourgeois agrarian country-
side (considered as the rich elite and the enemy of the Peronist cause) 
and the industrial workers’ urban areas (considered as the poor people 
to protect and emancipate from the elite’s domination). This was a real 
turning point:
The powerful thing with the conflict with the ‘campo’ was that it joined 
factions that were previously impossible to unite […] It gathered all spec-
trums of the rural producers: from the peasant to the agribusiness, and 
then many urban people who had never been supportive of the coun-
tryside; suddenly in this union we are all ‘el campo’, we are all with the 
‘campo’ against the government. (Environmental sociologist)
That conflict, and the related socio-economic and political struggles 
that occurred in its aftermath, seriously plagued the third kirchnerism 
(corresponding to the second mandate of Cristina kirchner, 2011–2015), 
which experienced a significant economic downturn: almost zero growth, 
a sharp decrease in private investment, and a sustained drop in commodity 
prices. It is in this light that we need to examine the successful emergence 
of “the bioeconomy” as a concept and political project in Argentina. 
Policymakers started to make explicit allusions to the bioeconomy from 
2012 onwards, often explicitly referring to the OECD, the European 
Commission, International Energy Agency and FAO’s definitions.
Argentina Innovadora 2020 was designed in 2012 as a Science, 
Technology and Innovation plan for the period 2012–2020. The Plan’s 
objective was markedly similar to the Lisbon Agenda goal: “sustainable 
development with social inclusion by improving the country’s economic 
competitiveness”. The Ministry for Science, Technology and Productive 
Innovation (MINCyT) focused its efforts on specific areas where the 
country has or can have comparative and/or competitive advantages. 
One of them, perhaps the most important one because of the relevance 
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10 EMBEDDED PROMISSORy FUTURES: THE RISE OF NETWORkED …  9
sector (Martinez Demarco 2013). Interviewees share this relevance when 
they address the bioeconomy today:
The issue of agro-industrialization is the main issue for us concerning the 
bioeconomy. (Public official from the Science, Technology and Productive 
Innovation Ministry)
For kirchnerists, it was a way to accommodate to the moving political-
economic landscape of a post-2008 Argentina, which threatened both 
the reelection of Cristina kirchner and the legacy of one decade of recov-
ered Peronism. Thus, kirchnerist policymakers realized that the inher-
ited historical dichotomies between agriculture and industry were falling 
apart, and considered it necessary to move beyond the idea of agriculture 
as a backward, elite rent-seeking sector.
Of course, agroindustry is the concept. I think there appears the value, 
why it was so important for Argentina […] I think in that sense the bio-
economy came to offer a smart way to rethink that and to go above and 
beyond the conflict [between the government and the campo] and to 
renew the agricultural sector that came to appear as a hub of innovation. 
(Agricultural economist 2)
The issue is that we believed we had to get out of [the historical dilemma 
between agriculture and industry] and that the word bioeconomy helped 
us to raise the issue of agro-industrial development. So that also had 
the virtue of putting value creation at the territorial level, bringing pro-
ducers closer to more stable markets, industrial contracts et cetera. […] 
Bioeconomy helps retain the population, which is important because we 
have to somehow stop internal migration. (Public official from the Science 
and Innovation Ministry)
The bioeconomy concept proved to be of particularly high  political 
value because it allowed policy-makers to return to discussing previ-
ously existing issues (especially, the political construction of a boundary 
between agriculture and industry) and to overcome the struggles over the 
distribution of surplus in the aftermath of the 2008 conflict. Interestingly, 
bioeconomy today is one of the few things that reconciles kirchnerism 
and Macrism. Both Peronist and conservative governments could indeed 
endorse this vision of rural development as an advanced way to integrate 
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10  P. DELVENNE
the technoScIentIfIc tranSformatIon of aGrIculture
The durable transformation of agriculture and the joint progression 
of ideas favoring the bioeconomy as a political project did not solely 
happen as a consequence of political-economic measures taken “from 
above”. Crucial developments also emerged “from below”, with farm-
ers’ grassroots activities as a crucial reservoir of power and action toward 
a new vision of agriculture. In this section, I discuss the emergence of 
that sociotechnical vanguard vision (Hilgartner 2015), and I show 
how it became possible for one small group equipped with this van-
guard vision to shape the future of agriculture by mobilizing resources 
and linking them up with their own technoscientific projects. Vanguard 
visions emanate from “relatively small collectives that formulate and act 
intentionally to realize particular sociotechnical visions of the future that 
have yet to be accepted by wider collectives” (Hilgartner 2015: 34). In 
doing so, these vanguard actors “typically assume a visionary role, per-
forming the identity of one who possesses superior knowledge of emerg-
ing technologies and aspires to realize their more desirable potential” 
(Hilgartner 2015: 34).
At the end of the 1980s, a small group of farmers who were both 
concerned by the environmental costs of their farming techniques and 
seeking productivity gains initiated what was going to become a major 
breakthrough in farming practices. These pioneers, who were inclined 
to make alterations to their agricultural machinery to accommodate 
desired changes in practice, started by replicating some machines they 
had seen in Brazil in order to avoid tilling the soil. With the support of 
technical advisors from Monsanto, they were encouraged to establish a 
non-till farming association, AAPRESID, which was created in 1989. 
AAPRESID members were concerned with articulating a new vision, 
for which they “[took] action on the ground actually to prototype, 
build and configure practices that should—literally—realize their ideas” 
(Hilgartner 2015: 35). By doing so, their vision set the scene for and 
anticipated the rapid and massive diffusion of no-till farming techniques. 
Today, Argentina is the world’s leading country in no-till farming tech-
niques,3 with a rate of 92% of adopters, and AAPRESID has become a 
very influential actor on the national and international scenes (Goulet 
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Declarations of a key AAPRESID official about a new agricultural rev-
olution reflect her important ambitions for the country and the world. 
She claims:
We take care of the soil for food security, which is essential; and we also 
want to achieve energy security because we are cultivating energy as well 
[…] We are working hard toward our 2020 strategy and we are a strate-
gic ally for the state partners, because we believe we can guarantee food, 
energy and environmental security. (AAPRESID official)
Interestingly, as the vision of a desirable future attainable through 
an “agricultural revolution” was taking shape, the dichotomies agri-
culture/industry and rural/urban came to be increasingly challenged in 
the technoscientific sphere, as they were in the political sphere. Crucially, 
new biotechnologies’ encounter with the vanguard vision promoted by 
AAPRESID linked that vision with an imaginary of national greatness, a 
technology-intensive agro-industry that would give Argentina back its right-
ful place in the economic geography of the world.
Argentina has this thing that even though we are a society that is export-
oriented with agriculture and the granary of the world and so on, […] 
we are very urban and at the cultural level actually we have this thing we 
want to be Europe, then… uh… there was a big disconnection that turned 
out into something else, this super-massive agrarian transformation that 
included adoption of biotech. (Environmental sociologist)
The cultural and organizational change that began with changes in 
farming practices has indeed been deepened and accelerated half a dec-
ade later, in 1996, when Roundup Ready (RR) soy was introduced into 
the country. Together with glyphosate-based herbicides and no-till farm-
ing, RR soy formed a homogenous “technological package” (i.e. actors 
use these terms to refer to the combination of these three elements to 
stress their joint and mutually reinforcing diffusion and commercializa-
tion), which transformed the paradigm of agriculture well beyond a reor-
ganization of production and existing business models. The technological 
package revolutionized production and dramatically increased soy’s prof-
itability, particularly when cultivated on a large scale (Trigo et al. 2002; 
Pena and Lema 2003). Because of its homogeneity and inherent simplic-
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12  P. DELVENNE
et al. 2013 for an overview), the package could easily travel across the 
country and be incorporated by farmers seeking higher yields and produc-
tivity. In turn, this further promoted the invention of a sustainable agro-
industry based on the constant incorporation of new technologies (GPS, 
smartphones, drones, precision agriculture), in which agricultural inno-
vation is portrayed as desirable and most likely to succeed if undertaken 
by “knowledge workers”. These workers interact across and even beyond 
the traditional sectors of agricultural value chains. Under this concep-
tion, which AAPRESID both represents and reproduces, the farmer is no 
longer portrayed as the one who cultivates his own lands but rather as a 
flexible, mobile and innovation-friendly entrepreneur.
SowInG PoolS and the rISe of networked aGrIbuSIneSS
With the expansion of the technological package, the figure of the farmer 
has been re-framed into an innovator-entrepreneur who never shies away 
from taking risks, incorporating new technological features into his collec-
tion of sophisticated machines, making his knowledge (technical, financial, 
agronomic, managerial) available to others through his active involvement 
in farmers’ associations,4 and being perfectly able to integrate networks of 
producers, investors and input suppliers in a win-win capital accumulation 
operation.5 This emerging figure embodies new relationships and a redis-
tribution of roles in agricultural production. While the Green Revolution 
was based on the production of knowledge by public institutions that pro-
vided farmers in need with “top-down” agricultural-technology solutions, 
farmers themselves now play a central role in the development and test-
ing of “bottom-up” innovative solutions. Public institutions are deemed 
“backward-looking” and incapable of knowing the real needs of farmers. 
Under this new configuration, private players are seen as best equipped 
to meet the need for expertise and technical support for farmers, particu-
larly through professional organizations such as AAPRESID or AACREA 
(Goulet and Hernandez 2011). Public institutions’ epistemic author-
ity over agricultural innovation is thus challenged by the emergence of a 
farmers’ identity empowered by farmers’ personal networks and knowl-
edge, oriented toward entrepreneurship, and supported by technological 
innovations, such as biotechnologies, no-till farming and precision agri-
culture. This co-produced worldview does not seem to leave any room 
for family farmers, who do not have the mind-sets of innovators-entrepre-
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capitalization, technologization and land concentration. Their continued 
existence as farmers is clearly in peril, now that even public institutions 
defending family farming evoke their programmed disappearance:
Small producers, people who have very little, five or four hectares, and finally 
end up getting subsidies through various channels - that is what they do - 
are perpetuating inefficient production. Actually what they ought to do is to 
quickly adjust to change and to strive for a better access to infrastructure, edu-
cation, roads. All those people have to leave the rural sector. (Economist 3)
Epistemic claims by and about farmers becoming innovators- 
entrepreneurs are reciprocally conditioned by the rise of new social forma-
tions such as sowing pools (pooles de siembra), which are taken here as a 
central instance of this agricultural bioeconomy. Sowing pools can be seen 
as instantiating a new hegemonic organizational model of agribusiness 
(Grosso 2010; Murmis and Murmis 2012; Gras and Hernandez 2013, 
2014). Sowing pools are defined as “agricultural trusts consisting of farm-
ers seeking to extend their scale of production, who gather temporarily 
(usually one planting season) to lease tracts of land as well as services for 
the main farming operations (planting, spraying and harvesting) and some-
times for transport. They also look for national or international investors, 
who may come from outside of the primary sector (banks, finance compa-
nies) as well as inside (agro-industrial firms, providers of agricultural inputs) 
to finance soybean production” (Choumert and Phelinas 2015: 134).
Some sowing pools operate with their own capital, including land 
ownership, but most pool capital from external investors and operate 
under short-term contracts (Leguizamon 2014: 153). The managers of 
the pools as well as those who do the farming are paid a salary, and inves-
tors receive profits on their investment depending on the export prices 
and volumes at the end of the season.
In these new social formations, small and medium-sized farmers have 
become “unable to catch up with capitalization and land scale demands, [so 
they] have opted out of production by leasing their land to larger farmers 
or investors, thus becoming rentiers” (Gras and Hernandez 2014: 344).
Interviewer (I):  These rentiers what do they do then?
Agronomist 3:  Usually they are sitting in the pub 
of a village with a cell phone with 
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contractor; if any decision needs to be 
taken he handles it very well at a dis-
tance.
Interviewer (I):  The rentiers those who stopped farm-
ing who own lands… Some became 
contractors and others not, what do 
they do?
Agricultural economist 2 (AE2): These others became nothing. Nothing.
I:  They do nothing they live well with 
just renting the land?
AE2:  Well, it depends on how much land you 
have and the quality of land. If you have 
50 ha and live in a village, with current 
rent levels you live phenomenally well.
Sowing pools’ managers, often working from afar in their Buenos Aires 
offices, are therefore interacting with landowners to lease the lands they 
need, while landowners themselves have also left the fields to live in vil-
lages and small towns. In this configuration, the closest producers to the 
land—and the bearers of the new farmer identity—are the so-called con-
tratistas (rural contractors), a group of about 12,000 people duly trained 
and equipped with the best possible machinery to offer contracted ser-
vices across the country, such as, for example planting seeds, fertilization, 
herbicides and insecticides spraying, packaging the harvest, et cetera.
Contractors emerge as small producers who have excess machinery and 
begin to provide services to the neighbors. Now, why did these small 
producers have excess machinery in the first place? That is the question, 
why had they bought more tractors? Because in Argentina I would say 
historically that there was no mortgage or credit to purchase fields. But 
you could access from public banks to buy machinery. So there have 
always been plans to purchase more machinery than what was needed… 
(Agricultural economist 3)
Most of the time, there is no contract, strictly speaking. This is a verbal 
agreement between a service provider (the contractor) and its temporary 
employer (the manager of the pool or the landowner). Contractors are 
very vulnerable to weather conditions, as one bad season means the col-
lapse of their business if they do not obtain sufficient income to cover the 
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producers with their own machinery, most contractors today lease the 
machinery they use in order to benefit from the most recent technologi-
cal advances and to be more competitive on the market of contratistas. 
The machinery industry incentivizes contractors by providing them free 
training sessions and by offering them credit facilities. However, getting 
the most recent machines is not always financially possible for every con-
tractor. Those who cannot afford it are thus locked in inferior techno-
logical possibilities (compared to their competitors) and they are paid 
with inferior salaries. Contractors have become a central actor in the net-
worked agribusiness of sowing pools.
The sowing pool needs contrastistas like water, because it will go 500 km 
away, rent land and seek some service contractors. If he can’t find any ser-
vice contractor, the guy [from the sowing pool] is dead. Therefore the sys-
tem is a network. (Agricultural economist 1)
Contractors became the vector of innovation, information and knowl-
edge. The quality of the services they offer and the productivity that can 
be expected from a sowing season depend on contractors’ capacity to 
keep up to date with cutting-edge innovations:
Each seller of agricultural machines has half its people training contratis-
tas to use the new machines […] Because the seller is obviously inter-
ested in that the John Deere machine has the best possible performance 
in the field, and to achieve that John Deere trains each type who buys 
the machine and offers him an ad hoc course, with yearly updates. Why? 
Because it is the form of economic capture when the guy changes the 
machine. Have you understood how much the system is innovative? […] 
It is a network of interests. The one leasing lands can pay high rents and 
capture more land if he manages to balance his budget. He does not have 
to manage the Chicago market, he manages productivity, and productivity 
is obtained with contractors. (Agricultural economist 2)
The technological package not only transfigured agricultural techniques, 
upset traditional roles of farmers, and challenged the epistemic authority of 
scientific public institutions; it also transformed agricultural management 
into network management.
[Previously], informal networks began almost by word of mouth and infor-
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that time, this came much later, as now the networks are completely man-
aging the distribution of inputs, large multinationals working in seeds that 
have established their own distribution centers, etc. And you, as a producer 
you’re in a network. (Agricultural economist 1)
Among the paradigmatic examples of agribusiness “made in Argentina” 
is the company Los Grobo which, although it is demonized in the media 
because it is often accused of abusing its market power, is “cited in almost 
all of the manuals, courses and reports on agribusinesses as having suc-
cessfully changed their mentality” (Gras and Hernandez 2014: 346). Los 
Grobo developed an innovative vertical integration strategy named “asso-
ciative network company”.6 The complexity of Los Grobo’s networks has 
served as a model for agro-industrial specialists and academic programs 
like Harvard Business School (Bell and Scott 2010). The model is based 
around building a network of input and service providers, including land-
owners, agronomists, contractors and agricultural production branch 
managers, so that instead of directly hiring employees or owning land or 
machinery, the company operates through land leases and third-party con-
tracting (Leguizamon 2016).7 The charismatic Director of the company, 
Gustavo Grobocopatel, envisioned the transformation of agriculture into 
a knowledge-based industry and rather than opting for the “heaviness” 
of lands and machinery, he preferred “an asset-light company: investing 
in soft assets—top talent, training, and state-of-the-art technology, for 
example—was a better investment for future growth in the twenty-first 
century” (Bell and Scott 2010: 5). Of course, not every sowing pool can 
be Los Grobo. From the basic idea of generating economies of scale by 
pooling resources have stemmed very different models of sowing pools: 
informal local pools (50–300 ha), large sowing pools (1000–50,000 ha) 
and network companies (up to 350,000 ha) (Grosso 2010).
A pool is a strategic alliance between people, where the management is 
centralized. It is the minimum expression of a pool, in my case I have a 
motorcycle and it is the entire heritage that my pool has (laughs), that 
and nothing else. Then, you have got that pool with 50 thousand hectares 
planted, with offices in Buenos Aires, trained economists, own contratistas, 
10 trucks and 15 agronomists… (Sowing pool manager 4)
However, in recent years, and particularly since 2012, producers have 
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600 USD/ton, and it’s now around 220 USD) and rising tensions with the 
government over export taxation. Consequently, many sowing pools have 
broken up, some have significantly decreased the magnitude of their opera-
tions, and still others have diversified their businesses or expanded abroad to 
neighboring countries. Los Grobo, for instance, moved part of its agricul-
tural business to Brazil and also to Uruguay and Paraguay, where the lack of 
good infrastructure is compensated for by the absence of soy export taxes. 
The contratistas, however, did not cross the borders with the asset-light 
companies. They remained attached to the lands they usually cultivate with 
their own machines. Under networked agribusiness, greater power and suc-
cess seem to correlate with greater mobility. Those who remain attached to 
particular pieces of land or particular points in the agribusiness network have 
fewer options. The mobility of powerful actors is not limited to geographic 
mobility: because the cost of coordination of its network had become 
too expensive in relation to soy’s decreasing profitability, Los Grobo (and 
other mega-network companies) expanded its network into other agribusi-
ness activities, such as the production of fertilizers and other agroindustrial 
inputs and even digital agriculture.8 This seems to be a general trend, which 
has been highlighted by Murmis and Murmis (2012: 496): “once a certain 
scale is reached, other avenues of business expansion start to dominate as 
the companies receive foreign investments, initiate projects in neighbor-
ing countries, move along or integrate additional parts of the supply chain, 
and create or extend networks with different levels of inter-company inte-
gration”. They add that network companies “seem to progress through an 
evolutionary path to a form where other non-farming avenues of business 
expansion start to dominate” (Murmis and Murmis 2012: 496).
These observations resonate with the findings of Carla Gras and Valeria 
Hernandez who studied the evolution of the heterogeneous large-scale 
farming sector in Argentina from the neoliberal 1990s onwards (Gras and 
Hernandez 2014). They found that the impact of neoliberalization has 
differently impinged on the category of large-scale farmers. According to 
them, network companies adopt inter-sectorial business models, are more 
flexible, and are less anchored in specific territories, and therefore are 
much more likely to adapt to changing circumstances than the traditional 
capitalist actors (agrarian bourgeoisie or large-scale farmers below the scale 
of network companies). Gras and Hernandez (2014) conclude that the 
remarkable growth of Argentinean agricultural production was accompa-
nied by a transformation of the agrarian capitalist class that weakened the 
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concluSIon
The bioeconomy is relatively new in Argentina as a concept and a politi-
cal project. To understand its emergence and to anticipate its future as a 
political project, this chapter has examined four decades of co-produced 
transformations at the political and technoscientific levels. ‘Agribusiness’ 
looks like the habitat of today’s bioeconomy in the country. It encapsu-
lates “a new worldview [not limited to] specific technological or organi-
zational innovations, but rather a systematic change that involves material, 
ideological and symbolic elements” (Gras and Hernandez 2014: 345). 
Agribusiness gained a hegemonic position; it contributed to regularizing 
and stabilizing the course of capital accumulation, including the “dis-
placement of conflicts, and crisis tendencies elsewhere and/or into the 
future’’ (Jessop 2008: 27). These include, most notably, the denial of 
the numerous socio-technical controversies on social and environmental 
impacts attributed to the “soyization of Argentina” (see Delvenne et al. 
2013 for an overview), such as deforestation, the displacement of indige-
nous populations, tensions with other productive activities like cattle rais-
ing, soil degradation because of proliferating monocultures, and a rise of 
cancers and malformations due the increasing use of agrochemicals (on 
collective actions challenging the bioeconomy, see Arancibia 2013).
To some extent, for the Argentinean agricultural bioeconomy, macro-
trends were clearly over-determined in important ways by the features of 
the local situation. We have seen that international developments, such 
as globalization, financialization, or corporatization have as much shaped 
new social relations and political configurations as local specificities and 
imaginations, national history, and the internal dynamics of the agricul-
tural production system. First, to deal with the aftermath of the structural 
neoliberal dismantlement of the country, to face the 2001 bankruptcy, 
and to feed the financial appetite of vulture funds, the kirchners’ gov-
ernments transformed a neoliberal agricultural model into the motor of 
an export-oriented national-populist system. Second, as part of a global 
phase of consolidation and transnationalization of the agriculture mar-
ket, which was dominated by multinational companies, new techno-
logical packages were introduced in Argentina in the mid-1990s. Their 
adoption was far from mechanical, as the imaginative resources of farm-
ers subsequently adapted the technological package in order to propagate 
their vision of sustainable agro-industry throughout the country. Third, 
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capitalization, land concentration, and ‘salarization’; while these trends 
severely impacted small-scale and traditional capitalist farmers, they also 
created a favorable environment for “asset-light companies” to flourish.
I have characterized this form of agribusiness in terms of networks, 
in order to stress its engagement with actors through both their (im)
material possessions (machinery, know-how, technologies, lands, expert 
knowledge) and their moral commitment to networks, social capital, 
diversity and information-sharing. The powerful actor in this imagined 
world privileges mobility and autonomy over security. S/he should not 
be attached to a family heritage, such as land, because it equates to fix-
ity and immobility. As I have shown, to be successful under networked 
agribusiness, the farmer—whoever this category today corresponds 
to—should favor leasing over ownership. This is simply the result of the 
need to travel light—from one province to another, from one country to 
another, from one sector to another—to move more easily when circum-
stances are changing (Boltanski and Chiappello 2005).
Lastly, unlike many other examples of hegemonic policy concepts cir-
culating from OECD countries to Latin America (for instance, the con-
cept of national innovation systems; Delvenne and Thoreau 2017), the 
bioeconomy has not been promoted in Argentina as part of a normative 
agenda of what had to happen in order to “catch up” with Northern 
countries. Rather, it results from an explicit choice of policymak-
ers to refer to the concept in an instrumental way in order to achieve 
a national political project that seems to transcend the well-entrenched 
divisions between self-proclaimed “anti-neoliberal” and conservative 
governments. As a preferred route for reaping the benefits of the coun-
try’s competitiveness, the bioeconomy extends the agribusiness logic that 
has dominated for decades and, more importantly, it allows a discursive 
industrializing of agriculture. In bioeconomic terms, at least in the way 
“bioeconomy” is currently used in Argentinean policy arenas, agriculture 
is thus “diluted” into industry, revamped as just another (Pehlivan et al.) 
industry that can thus be supported by Peronist and conservative gov-
ernments alike, without generating internal contradictions.
In Argentina, the bioeconomy is at the center of intense imagina-
tive activities to re-think agriculture as-we-knew-it, and to re-name it 
as “agro-industry”. These developments are evidence of an attempt to 
reject the idea of agriculture as the reactionary stronghold of a backward 
bourgeoisie and instead embrace agriculture as generative of an industrial 
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noteS
1.  http://www.bioeconomia.mincyt.gob.ar/bioeconomia-argentina/.
2.  Nestor kirchner remained very influential until his sudden death in 
October 2010.
3.  The most technically advanced option of no-tillage is direct seeding: no 
ploughing is done before planting, which is done directly in the mulch 
(remains of vegetation) on the ground (hence the term “direct-seeding”). 
Two sine qua none elements are necessary for the realization of these par-
ticular seedings: (i) the use of drills designed specifically for this purpose, 
able to plant the seed using a disk system into unploughed soil, and (ii) 
the use of chemical herbicides offsetting the absence of ploughing, one of 
whose functions is precisely to improve the soil structure, and to mechani-
cally destroy weeds (Goulet 2013: 441–442).
4.  In addition to participating in AAPRESID congresses and meetings, 
medium and large-scale farmers are very often also members of AACREA, 
a farmers’ association of over 200 local “CREA groups”, distributed in 18 
different regions all over the country and focussing on all kinds of agri-
cultural production. In exchange for a fee (between 100 and 500 US$/
month), each member can access the so-called community of AACREA 
farmers, participate in monthly discussions (gathering 10–15 producers 
from the same region) and benefit from dedicated R&D support. Each 
of these groups has a technical coordinator and one of the producers is 
appointed president of the group for a limited period of time, to voice and 
represent the group’s interests at regional or national meetings.
5.  The formal training of knowledge workers to act like innovators is also an 
important asset for the functioning of the system. A press article report-
ing on the findings of a comparison of the profile of medium-scale farm-
ers in Argentina and the United States revealed interesting findings: the 
Argentinean average farmer is 7 years younger than his American counter-
part (47 years old in Argentina, 54 in the US), almost twice as much edu-
cated in universities (4% of farmers in Argentina have a university degree, 
for only 25% of US farmers) and twice as many Argentinean farmers (10, 
versus 5% in the US) have postgraduate degrees. See http://www.lana-
cion.com.ar/1317397-ventaja-argentina.
6.  See the company’s website. http://www.losgrobo.com.ar.
7.  See also the article published in The Economist, “Farming without Fields” 
(2014), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21592662-argentine-
farming-group-heavy-science-and-light-assets-farming-without-fields, accessed 
on 24 of October 2016.
8.  Los Grobo recently partnered with another company to create Frontec, a 
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latest in geospatial and agricultural science with ICT, to offer innovative 
and sustainable solutions to the agribusiness value chain”. See http://
www.frontec.net/eng/, accessed on 24 of October 2016.
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